A "best-effort" authentication method, which is easier to attack than generic authentication methods (but requires fewer computations for benign nodes), may be sufficient for certain networking scenarios. We illustrate this point by examining the case of fragment authentication by intermediaries in an opportunistic network. We describe mechanisms for implementing best-effort authentication, with the caveat that an authentication strength sufficient in one scenario may be unfit for another.
Introduction and Motivation
Uncontrolled messaging by resource hogs results in disproportionate allocation of the network resources required to serve those nodes. Even a small number of hogs greatly reduces message delivery ratios for the remaining users [10] . However, this can be controlled through resource management schemes: Nodes group themselves into cooperative domains that prioritize incoming messages based on sender authentication. Messages sourced from fellow domain members are given higher priority [10] .
Research has shown that message fragmentation can improve delivery ratios in opportunistic networks through better utilization of available contact opportunities [9] . Fragmentation in the presence of resource hogs implies the need for publicly verifiable fragment authentication. Without fragment authentication, intermediaries will assign fragments (even from a valid domain member) the lowest priority. The end result is lower message delivery ratios.
Very strong authenticity guarantees -i.e. limiting false positive (impersonation) probabilities to < 2 −80 [6] -may be not needed in our application scenario. The premise, that we are going to verify in this paper, is that a small number of false positives will not significantly impact overall delivery ratios of domain members. We investigate best-effort authentication where the probability of false positives is allowed to be much higher than in typical authentication schemes. This allows a trade-off between degree of authenticity for reduced transmission and computation overhead.
Motivated by these concerns, we raise the following questions:
1. How seriously does a lack of fragment authentication impact the effectiveness of resource management techniques against resource hogs?
2. To what extent can the benefits of resource management techniques be retained with best-effort authentication?
3. What are the overhead costs incurred by full and besteffort fragment authentication schemes?
To investigate these questions we extended the environment simulated in [10] to support fragmentation. We confirmed that resource management schemes are negatively impacted when intermediaries are unable to verify fragmented messages. We also learned that our target network scenario can operate using best-effort authentication techniques with false positive rates as high as 60%. Finally, we describe techniques for implementing best-effort fragment authentication, analyze computational and space overhead, and present an informal security analysis.
We conjecture that best-effort authentication may be applicable in other opportunistic networking scenarios. One scenario, involving best-effort verification of short-lived certificates, is outlined in our technical report [11] . The caveat with best-effort authentication is that authentication strength sufficient in one scenario may be unfit for another.
Opportunistic Networks and Fragmentation

Fragmentation in brief
The DTN architecture RFC [2] describes two methods for message fragmentation in opportunistic networks: proactive and reactive. Proactive fragmentation occurs (only) at the source node prior to message transmission. Reactive fragmentation occurs immediately after a transmission link on the message path is interrupted. The receiving node constructs a new partial message from all received data, while the sender retains the full message.
Our investigations focus on the second method due to its general applicability and exhibited performance gains in [9] . We investigate a variant of reactive fragmentation where messages are fragmented at sender-defined boundaries. We use the term scrap to refer to the smallest authenticatable unit implied by fragment authentication schemes, e.g., "toilet-paper" [4] or Merkle hash tree [1] . (Those schemes are described towards in Section 2.3). With this approach, new partial fragments are only created from the complete scraps that are received.
Simulated Environments
The environment of [10] was extended to support fragmentation and best-effort authentication. Parameters were selected to simulate a mobile ad-hoc DTN scenario with people traveling throughout city streets using their personal devices to exchange photographs and short videos.
Node Hardware: Nodes communicate over 2 Mbit/s bidirectional wireless links with messages generated at a rate of one message per node per hour. Message source and destination are selected uniformly at random while the message size distribution varies with each mobility model (see below).
Routing Algorithm: The binary mode version of Sprayand-Wait [12] , with 10 message copies, was selected as the primary routing algorithm version because it exhibited the highest delivery ratios while being most impacted by resource hogs. In binary mode, half of available message copies are transferred to the next hop until a single copy remains. At this point, nodes revert to direct-delivery mode.
Domain Settings: Nodes are divided into two disjoint groups: those that belong to a co-operative domain and those that fall outside that domain. The former contains 90% of the total network while the outsider domain contains the remaining 10%. Domain members cooperate to increase their delivery ratios by prioritizing fellow domain-member messages. For instance, outsider messages are the first to be discarded when allocating new storage space. Outsiders are uncooperative and handle all messages with equal priority.
We investigated two synthetic mobility models and one real-world trace model corresponding to different contact patterns. Certain parameters, e.g., message size distribution and network load, varied between the models as follows:
Random Waypoint(RWP): The simplest mobility model restricts movements to an area of 1km×1km. Points are selected uniformly at random and nodes behave as described in the general synthetic parameters described in Section 2.2.
Map-Based: The map-based mobility model restricts movement to existing roads, highways, and pedestrian paths in the downtown area of Helsinki, Finland. Destination points are selected uniformly at random with a bias towards points of interest, e.g., movie theaters and metro stations.
In the synthetic models above, a total of 250 nodes move at a speed selected uniformly at random between 0.5-1.5 m/s. Upon reaching the destination a node pauses for 0-120 seconds (randomly selected) before continuing. Message sizes are distributed uniformly at random between 500KB-5MB with a time-to-live of two hours. Message generation is restricted to the first ten (out of twelve) hours. This gives all messages an opportunity to traverse the network.
RollerNet Trace: RollerNet traces are real-world contact patterns extracted from an experiment conducted by Tournoux, et al [13] . A total of 62 skaters in the Paris roller tour were given Bluetooth equipped Intel iMotes [3] to record opportunistic sightings of neighboring Bluetooth devices.
Although over 1,000 unique devices were recorded, many were only seen in passing. Our simulations only consider the 517 devices seen more than once. We also mention that trace data only includes devices directly seen by the iMotes and restrict message generation to the first 62 nodes. The remaining nodes act as gateways that receive and forward data.
The RollerNet tour lasted three hours and is much shorter than the 12 hour duration used in the synthetic traces. In order to see the same effects of fragmentation and resource hogs we changed message size range to 10MB-15MB and increased the storage buffer to 100MB.
Simulation Results
Impact of Fragmentation:
The first set of simulations, summarized in Table 1 , show how fragmentation improves delivery ratios, when all nodes are honest. Those improvements, are due to better utilization of contact opportunities, and mirror the results in [9] .
Resource Management Schemes: We now investigate the effect of resource hogs and see if introducing coarse-grained resource management from [10] improves delivery ratios.
In coarse-grained resource management, nodes group themselves into domains and give priority to other domain members. Nodes discard messages to make space for in- Fragment Authentication and Resource Management: We now investigate the effect of fragmentation when combined with resource management schemes based on full message authentication. Table 3 shows delivery ratios are unaffected when hogs are not present. Since nodes do not compete for resources, messages are easily delivered. However, there is a slight improvement in delivery ratios from Table 1 . This effect is a result of resource management: an increased delivery ratio for domain members is at the expense of a decreased ratio for outsiders.
When resource hogs are introduced, the delivery ratio r immediately drops in all mobility models. This is a result of fragments (no longer verifiable) being assigned the lowest priority by intermediaries. These fragments, the first to be discarded when storage buffers are full, lead to lower delivery ratios. The loss of just a single fragment can prevent an entire message from being reconstructed. We conclude that a lack of fragment authentication severely reduces the effectiveness of resource management schemes. Still, when we compare Table 1 and Table 3 , we see r is better in this scenario than when there is no fragmentation at all.
Mobility
No If we add fragment authentication to the resource management schemes we can restore delivery ratios to the baseline case when no resource hogs are present (Table 4 , right data column). This is a direct result of intermediaries once again correctly prioritizing messages from domain members. We conclude that fragmentation must be coupled with fragment authentication. This approach optimizes transmission opportunities while simultaneously protecting network resources. In all of the above scenarios we modeled fragment authentication with strong, i.e., cryptographic, security guarantees. We now describe two techniques for strong fragment authentication.
10% hogs
The Delay-Tolerant-Network (DTN) security architecture draft [4] defines the toilet-paper approach. A source host fragments a message and attaches a digital signature to each fragment.
Another approach is to use Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) as described in [1] . Messages are proactively divided into fragments and the corresponding MHT root is signed and attached as an authentication token. To verify an individual fragment a sender must include the hashes along the co-path to the root. If the computed hash does not match the signed root hash then the fragment is invalid.
But strong security guarantees may not be required for our specific application scenario. It is possible that authentication mechanisms, with weaker levels of security, are sufficient and can retain the benefits gained by resource management techniques. We investigate this possibility next.
Best-Effort Authentication
Intuitively, a best-effort fragment authentication scheme guarantees authenticity of a fragment with a certain probability: valid fragments are guaranteed to be verified (i.e., no false negatives). An invalid fragment may, however, be verified with probability p (resulting in false positive). We conjecture that dropping a valid fragment is more harmful than carrying an invalid fragment. The prior case results in being unable to reconstruct a message while the latter increases reconstruction effort. In essence, some false positives are acceptable, while false negatives are not. A drawback to carrying some invalid fragments is the potential increase in message reconstruction effort for the destination node. (That node must determine which received fragments are valid.)
We emphasize here that best-effort authentication is only intended for resource management in intermediaries. It does not replace traditional end-to-end message integrity schemes. Best-effort authentication, when used in conjunction with a traditional end-to-end integrity scheme, does not affect original message integrity.
Best-Effort Resource Management
We now investigate the effect of best-effort fragment authentication in restoring delivery ratios in the presence of resource hogs. To understand the effectiveness of the approach, we focus on normalized delivery ratios (r). These ratios are normalized with respect to the case where fragmentation is used but no hogs are present (right data column of Table 1 ).
Fragment authentication is modeled as a generic algorithm that accepts invalid fragments with a certain (falsepositive) probability rate p varied in increments of 0.2 between zero and one. We assume that p is a fixed systemwide parameter and comment that our goal is to study the effects of best-effort authentication. Although other strategies are possible, e.g., p values that vary per node, we have not studied the implications of such approaches. Figure 1 shows the delivery ratios against varying p values for the random waypoint model, map-based mobility model, and RollerNet traces. In each case we assume that 10% of the nodes are resource hogs and keep the remaining parameters unchanged. Note that p = 0 corresponds to using strong-authentication and can also be mapped directly to the values in the right column of Table 4 . This difference illustrates the effectiveness of resource management schemes.
In each scenario we see false-positive rate increase to as much as p = 0.6, with minor impact tor. At p = 0.8, we see a larger, possibly still acceptable, decrease. At p = 1, corresponding to no authentication, we once again see the 
Spot-Checking
The simplest technique involves taking an existing strong authentication scheme and performing verification with probability 1−p. The actual false positive rate depends on the overall load imposed by the resource hogs. For instance, if half of all bundles seen by an intermediary node with p = 0.2 are from resource hogs then the false positive rate is 0.5 × 0.8 = 0.4.
Using the same approach with fragment verification, an intermediary verifies only a subset of received fragments without harming the overall network. Spot-checking is simple, easily mapped to the graphs in 3.1, and reduces processing overhead for intermediaries. However, it does not reduce transmission or storage overhead.
Additional Approaches
We now describe another best-effort authentication technique based on Bloom filters. A third technique, based on truncated hashes, is given in [11] .
Bloom filters are probabilistic data structures used for determining set membership. Elements are added to a bit array of size of m based on the output of k hash functions. Bloom filters offer a trade-off between space, computation, and false-positive probability: increasing m decreases the false-positive probability, but also increases storage and transmission requirements. Similarly, increasing the number k of hash functions decreases false-positive probability at the expense of increased computational costs.
A best-effort authentication scheme can be constructed by simply adding all message scraps into a filter attached to the message header. Intermediaries can then use the filter for verifying all fragments that are subsequently received. The parameters of the Bloom filter define the false positive rates for the best-effort scheme.
Transmission and computation overhead
In this section, we give the transmission and computation overhead per message of both strong and best-effort authentication constructions; total overhead in a network is a multiple of per message overhead. Transmission overhead is analyzed in terms of the increase in message size. The sizes of digital signature and the cryptographic hash function output are denoted, respectively, by σ and H. Recall that n is the number of scraps.
We first analyze the transmission and computation overheads of strong authentication schemes.
Toilet-paper: Total transmission overhead is one signature per scrap: n * σ. Total computation overhead is n signature verifications.
Merkle Hash Tree: The transmission overhead depends on the number of co-path hashes sent. If radio contact duration over the opportunistic link is known a priori, then the exact number of scraps and co-path hashes can be sent. In general, contact durations are not known and nodes must interleave scraps with co-path hashes. (We illustrate a technique for reducing the number of co-path hashes sent over a single link in [11] .) Total transmission overhead: σ + (n × H). The verification overhead for a complete message is one signature verification and 2n − 1 hashes to compute the full hash tree. Spot checking: As described above, the spot checking best-effort authentication technique reduces the computation overhead of intermediate nodes by a factor 1 − p; it does not affect the transmission overhead.
Bloom filter: The transmission overhead depends on n, p, and the number of hash functions, k. The exact size can be computed as: kn ) k . The verification overhead for a complete message is one signature verification and k * n hashes.
Example values: Assume a strong 1024-bit RSA signature, SHA-1 (160 bit output) for H, and a message size of 5 MB with 100 KB scraps. We now graph the total transmission overhead (in bytes) of a Bloom filter as a function of p with six values of k in Figure 2 . This figure shows the overhead savings that can be achieved when we vary the value of k to achieve a desired p.
Please note that these savings are small relative to our assumed scrap or message size. Therefore, in this case, saving 600 bytes per message is unlikely to noticeably increase delivery ratios. While not much is gained in our target scenario there may be situations where overhead is important. As the ratio between scrap size and message size decreases the importance of overhead increases.
In general, the savings in transmission time with best effort authentication depend on the typical message size, the false positives rate p and the technique used. (For example, spot checking does not reduce transmission time). We have shown that, independently of mobility model, significant savings, as compared to MHT, are possible for certain message size ranges and p values. 
Security Analysis
In this section we describe an adversary model and analyze a message 'harvesting' attack. Two additional attack types are analyzed in our technical report [11] .
Adversarial Model: We assume the adversary is not a domain member, but can record messages as a direct recipient or by intercepting transmissions. The adversary does not actively interfere with transmissions, e.g., by frequency jamming. Finally, the adversary has no storage restrictions, but can only perform a polynomial number of computations.
The goal of the adversary is to construct fragments that intermediaries authenticate as belonging to domain members. Forged fragments receive higher priority and improve the personal delivery ratios of the adversary.
Harvesting Attacks: An adversary attempts to forge domain member fragments by harvesting legitimate messages and attempting to impersonate them. The specific threat from harvesting depends on the best-effort authentication mechanism being used:
Spot-checking used in conjunction with a strong authentication scheme does not increase the offline attack advantage if the underlying cryptographic primitive is secure. The overall probability of successfully delivering a forged fragment depends on p and i, where i is the number of hops on the path to the destination. If we assume, for simplicity, that all intermediaries independently verify fragments with the same probability 1 − p, then the probability of a successful attack is p i . Harvesting many signed Bloom filters can lead to an offline pre-image attack. An attacker, who computes a valid pre-image, can replace individual scraps of arbitrary messages using the compromised Bloom filter. To limit the damage from this attack we can include a random number in the header as a unique message identifier and hash it into the Bloom filter. This makes attacks more difficult by binding the authentication token to a specific message.
Related Work
Fragment authentication can be viewed as an instance of the secure set membership problem: Given a set of elements, S, provide a proof for an element s i ∈ S that any party can verify. Cryptographic accumulators [5] combine all elements of S into a single fixed-size accumulator and generate a short witness to verify each s i ∈ S. But the computational overhead of these schemes make them impractical for opportunistic networks.
Partridge proposes in [7] cumulative authentication where sets of fragments are verified instead of individual fragments. This reduces computation when receiving contiguous sequences of data but requires fragments to follow the same path.
Streaming-data authentication (see, e.g., [8] ) and fragment authentication are closely related. The main difficulty of using the former in opportunistic networks is the premise that packets are sent and verified sequentially. Also, key release based on time is not feasible in opportunistic networks where contact link durations are unknown.
Summary
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of fragmentation on the effectiveness of resource management schemes in the ad-hoc opportunistic network scenario of [10] . We found that fragmentation must be coupled with fragment authentication schemes to both optimize and protect network resources. We also observed that strong security guarantees are not required for messages conveyed by intermediate nodes using best-effort authentication. With this knowledge, opportunistic network designers can determine how to trade-off between strong cryptographic guarantees and improved delivery ratios through decreased transmission overhead. We speculate that this may also be relevant in other scenarios, but requires a careful security analysis for each specific case.
